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ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT-
NAACP V. CIVILETTI
The protection of an individual's civil rights from governmental infringe-
ment often entails extensive adjudication; consequently, the preservation of
constitutional rights could depend upon a person's ability to afford the high
costs of litigation. If individuals are precluded from full appreciation of their
civil rights due to their lack of financial resources, such rights become mere
privileges of the wealthy.' To ensure equal access to the courts for all citi-
zens, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (Fees
Act) 2 which authorizes an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party3 in
any action or proceeding brought under certain civil rights laws. 4 This legis-
lative policy has been implemented by federal court decisions allowing
1. See generally Falcon, Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Liti-
gation, 33 MD. L. REv. 379 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Falcon]; Note, Civil Rights -Attorneys'
Fees, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 223 (1969).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides
as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], or in
any civil action or proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to
enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Rev-
enue Code, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.],
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id.
The Senate Report describes the purpose of the Fees Act as follows:
[C]ivil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity
to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to
enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must
have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court.
S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). See also H. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1976).
3. The term "prevailing party" has been defined to include both a victor after a final judg-
ment on the merits and a litigant who succeeds prior to a full hearing before a judge or a jury.
See H. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1976). Courts have awarded attorney's fees
to a party in a suit even though that party did not prevail on the merits. Provided that a
genuine civil rights issue is involved, the outcome of the litigation is not the determining factor
in the allowance of a fee award. See, e.g., Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979).
4. See note 2 supra.
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awards of attorney's fees against both private parties 5 and state govern-
ments 6 under the Fees Act.
In NAACP v. Civiletti,7 a suit brought under the Fees Act, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia severely limited the scope of the Fees
Act by denying an award of attorney's fees when the federal government was
the defendant. The court ruled that a statutory expression of sovereign im-
munity prevented an award of attorney's fees against the federal government
in the absence of other specific statutory authorization 8 or consent of the
United States.9 Because the NAACP court interpreted the Fees Act as not
providing such specific statutory authorization, private party suits against the
United States in certain civil rights actions will be inhibited.
This Note argues that the NAACP court's interpretation of the Fees Act is
antithetical to the congressional purpose behind the Act. Additionally, it
5. See, e.g., McNamara v. Moody, 606 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1979) (attorney's fees awarded
under the Fees Act against prison official n his official and individual capacities).
6. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1977) (state barred from asserting an eleventh amend-
ment defense against liability for fee awards); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979)
(attorney's fees awarded under Fees Act against Connecticut Commissioner of Social Services);
Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (attorney's fees awarded against
University of Puerto Rico); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979) (attorney's fees
awarded against both county and state commissioners of social services); Bagby v. Beal, 606
F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979) (attorney's fees awarded against officials of state department of public
welfare); Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1979) (award of attorney's fees against State
Department of Corrections); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 608 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1979) (attorney's fees awarded against school district and several of its officials in suit alleg-
ing racial discrimination); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Anderson, 569 F.2d
1027 (8th Cir. 1978) (attorney's fees awarded against Omaha city officials); Howard v. Phelps,
443 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1978) (attorney's fees awarded against Secretary of State Depart-
ment of Corrections in his official capacity).
7. 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. A statutory grant of sovereign immunity with respect to attorney's fees is found at 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), which provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by Statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in Section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of
attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official of the United States acting in his
official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such action ...
Id. (emphasis added).
This statute is ancillary to the federal doctrine of sovereign immunity, an implied policy
immunizing the United States from suit without its consent. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255,
270 (1896). Title 28 establishes that even in those cases in which the United States has con-
sented to suit, it nevertheless maintains its immunity from fee awards absent a relevant statute
creating federal liability for attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976). For a more detailed discus-
sion of federal sovereign immunity and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, see notes 16 and 17 and accompany-
ing text infra.
9. Under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, "[ilt is now well settled-
though for a century the rule was stated only in dicta-that the United States may not be sued
without its consent." C. WRICHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22, at 82 (3d ed. 1976). See,
e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1948) (a suit is barred if"it is, in
substance, a suit against the Government over which the court, in the absence of consent, has
no jurisdiction").
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shows that the Fees Act, by its very language, could include the United
States within its ambit. Finally, it explores the impact the federal immunity
from liability for attorney's fees will have upon civil rights litigation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE
The general rule governing awards of attorney's fees is the "American
rule," under which each party to litigation is responsible for his or her own
attorney's fees. 10 A few exceptions to this rule have arisen from judicial
exercise of equitable powers and from congressional mandate." Even
under one of these exceptions, however, awards of attorney's fees have still
been denied where the federal 12 or state government' 3 was the defendant.
10. The "American rule" originated from a general distrust of lawyers. The assumption un-
derlying the rule was that if attorney's fees were available to litigants, lawyers might encourage
unnecessary litigation. One court has summarized the original rationale behind the "American
rule": "[T]he American practice of generally not including counsel fees in costs was a deliberate
departure from the English practice, stemming initially from the colonies' distrust of lawyers
and continued because of a belief that the English system favored the wealthy and unduly
penalized the losing party." Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 672 (2d Cir.
1960). The rule was reaffirmed in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714 (1967), where the Court stated that "the poor might be unjustly discouraged from institut-
ing actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents'
counsel." Id. at 718.
11. The four major federal law exceptions to the American rule are: (1) statutory exceptions;
(2) the bad faith theory; (3) the "common-fund" theory; and (4) the "private attorney general"
theory. Examples of statutes that include provisions for the allowance of attorney's fees include:
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1876, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); Clean Air Act,
§ 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (Supp. 11 1978); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-3(b) (1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 8 12(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1976). For a
complete list of statutes that allow attorney's fees, see Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1974).
The "bad-faith" theory allows courts to award attorney's fees against a party who willfully
violated a legal duty. The underlying purpose is to punish the guilty party and to deter others
from bad faith conduct in the future. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1968). The "common fund" theory, which allows fees to a single party acting
on behalf of a larger group, was used as the rationale for fee awards in Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), and more recently, in
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The "private attorney general" theory was
established in the Supreme Court decision, Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises Inc., 390 U.S.
400 (1968). The purpose of this theory is to allow a recovery of attorney's fees to a private party
who advances an issue of importance to the general public.
For a general discussion of the exceptions to the American rule and the rationale behind
these exceptions, see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CAL. L. RE'. 792 (1966); Thueson, Slipping from the American Rule Straight Jacket, 40 MONT.
L. REV. 308 (1979); Taylor, Resistance Stiffens to the Abandonment of the Rule, 5 ORANGE
COUNTY B.J. 343 (1978); Comment, Theories of Recovering Attorney's Fees: Exceptions to the
American Rule, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 566 (1979).
12. See Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F. Supp. 891 (D. Or. 1977); Shan-
non v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 433 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
13. See Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court decision in Hutto v. Finney, 437
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In such cases, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been applied to pro-
tect the governmental entity from incurring liability for fees. Until recently,
state governments remained immune from liability for attorney's fees under
a general eleventh amendment grant of sovereign immunity. 14 Moreover,
the federal government has consistently been protected from liability for fee
awards by an explicit statutory grant of sovereign immunity as contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2412.15
The federal doctrine of sovereign immunity, which shields the United
States from lawsuit, is an implied governmental protection having its source
in the common law. 16  Because the purpose of the doctrine is only to pro-
tect the federal government, the United States may waive this immunity. A
statutory exception often is essential to surmount the formidable barrier
posed by the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity,' 7 but the courts
strictly construe statutory waivers.' 8 Evidencing the strength of the doc-
trine is 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which forbids implied waivers of federal sovereign
immunity with respect to attorney's fees.' 9 Essentially, this statute requires
the existence of other express authority in order to create federal govern-
ment liability for attorney's fees.
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society ,20 underscored the vitality of section 2412. The Wilderness Society,
seeking to prevent the issuance of a government permit necessary for con-
struction of the trans-Alaska pipeline, brought suit against the Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company and the United States Secretary of the Interior.
U.S. 687 (1977), however, now bars the states from asserting an eleventh amendment defense
against liability for fee awards. For a general discussion of the Hutto decision, see notes 29-31
and accompanying text infra.
14. See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 504 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421
U.S. 982 (1974); Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1974). See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1875 (1975). In the context of attorney's fees, however, the eleventh amendment defense is no
longer open to the states. See note 13 supra and notes 29-31 and accompanying text infra. For a
general discussion of the eleventh amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity, see C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 46, at 197 (3d ed. 1976) ("a state is immune from suit in federal
court unless it consents"). See also C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY (1972); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L.
REV. 207, 214-17 (1968).
15. See note 8 supra.
16. See note 9 supra.
17. Examples of statutes that waive federal sovereign immunity include 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)
(1976), which gives district courts jurisdiction over damage actions based on contract, federal
law or regulations, or the Constitution (provided the amount in controversy is less than $10,000)
and also § 410 of the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), which grants district courts
jurisdiction over certain tort claims against the federal government.
18. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22, at 83 (3d ed. 1976).
19. See note 8 supra.
20. 421 U.S. 240 (1974). Alyeska involved an environmental issue advanced by the Wilder-
ness Society. The plaintiff attempted to prevent issuance of government permits necessary for
construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline.
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The plaintiffs alleged that the government was liable for attorney's fees
under the private attorney general theory, an exception to the American rule
that allows the federal courts to award attorney's fees to parties vindicating
important public rights.2 1  The Alyeska Court reasoned that because the
purpose of this exception is to hold government officials accountable to the
public, it should follow that in such cases the government would be liable
for attorney's fees. 22  Finding the federal government protected from liabil-
ity for fee awards under section 2412, however, the Court decided that this
statute prevented fee awards under the private attorney general theory.
Thus, the Alyeska Court held that absent express statutory authorization, the
United States is not liable for attorney's fees. 23  Furthermore, the Court
stated that it is the responsibility of Congress, not the courts, to determine
which public policies merit a fee award.24
Accepting the Alyeska Court's challenge to create an express waiver of
section 2412, Congress passed the Fees Act. 25  The purpose of the Act is
twofold. First, it is intended to create uniformity among the remedies avail-
able under federal civil rights laws. 26  Through its broad, encompassing pro-
visions, the Act allows recovery of fees in all actions that do not already
contain an explicit fee provision. 27  Second, the Act is intended to encour-
age private suits under civil rights laws .28
21. Id. at 265-67.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 267-68. The Court stated that it was not within its discretion to authorize a fee
award which, "if allowable at all, must be expressly provided for by statute." Id.
24. Id. at 269. The Court explained: "It appears to us that the rule suggested here and
adopted by the Court of Appeals [awarding attorney's fees] would make major inroads on a
policy matter that Congress has reserved for itself." Id. The Court further stated that in addi-
tion to requiring statutory authorization for fee awards against the federal government, "the
federal courts [should not] purport to adopt on their own initiative a rule awarding attorneys'
fees based on the private-attorney-general approach when such judicial rule will operate only
against private parties and not against the Government." Id.
25. That the Fees Act was enacted in response to Alyeska is indicated by the remarks of
Senator Mathias: "I believe that [the Fees Act] constitutes a much needed response to Alyeska
and is necessary to guarantee the proper enforcement of our civil rights laws which the Con-
gress has so earnestly labored for in the past." 122 CONG. REC. S31,471 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1976).
26. Senator Kennedy expressed the need for uniformity of fee provisions in civil rights stat-
utes:
This bill [the Fees Act] would close a series of loopholes in our civil rights laws
created by the Supreme Court's Alyeska decision last year, and would reestablish a
uniformity in the remedies available under federal laws guaranteeing civil and con-
stitutional rights. ... The result is plain: few private civil rights enforcement actions
can now be brought under these Federal statutes not providing for fee awards. The
bill before us today would eliminate this anomaly by permitting courts to make
discretionary fee awards under all Federal civil rights statutes.
122 CONG. REC. S31,472 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
27. See S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1976). Under some civil rights
statutes, attorney's fees provisions are included. Under other statutes protecting the same
rights, however, there may. be no attorney's fee provision. It is the stated purpose of the Fees
Act to remedy the "gaps in the language of these civil rights laws by providing the specific
authorization required by the Court in Alyeska. ... Id. at 4.
28. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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After the enactment of the Fees Act, the courts were presented with the
question of whether the language of the Fees Act is specific enough to be
applicable to governmental entities in the face of the eleventh amendment
and section 2412 defenses. The Supreme Court held, in Hutto v. Finney
29
that state governments may be held liable for attorney's fees under the Fees
Act. The Court pointed out the existence of a historical tradition allowing
awards of litigation costs against the states without regard to eleventh
amendment immunity. The Court further noted that the Fees Act specifi-
cally allowed for fees as part of the costs of litigation. In light of these fac-
tors, the Hutto Court concluded that there existed no constitutional barrier
to such awards. 30
Moreover, the Hutto Court analyzed the language of the Fees Act provid-
ing that "in any action" to enforce civil rights reasonable attorney's fees may
be awarded. Concentrating on the phrase "any action," the Court reasoned
that such general language gave very broad scope to the Act.3 ' Further, the
Court found no explicit exception for the states either in the language of the
statute or in the legislative context in which it was enacted. Accordingly, the
Hutto Court concluded that the statute must be read to include the states
within its provisions.
Although the Hutto decision clearly held the Fees Act applicable to state
governments, the issue of federal governmental liability under the Act re-
mained unsettled. The most recent attempt by a federal court to ascertain
the propriety of an award against the federal government under the Fees Act
is NAACP v. Civiletti.32
FACTS OF NAACP v. CIVILETTI
NAACP v. Civiletti was a consolidation of two district court cases involving
claims for attorney's fees under the Fees Act. The first case, NAACP v.
Bell,3 3 arose out of the fatal shooting of a black man, Carnell Russ, by a
white police officer during an arrest for a traffic violation.3 4 The Justice
Department chose not to prosecute the arresting officer under the federal
criminal civil rights statute. 35 The Russ family and the NAACP, however,
29. 437 U.S. 678 (1977).
30. Id. at 697. The Hutto Court noted that clear congressional intent to abrogate the states'
eleventh amendment defense may be found where Congress "does not impose enormous bur-
dens on the States." Id. Because it did not consider the costs of litigation to be an enormous
burden, the Court concluded that it was unnecessary for state liability to be explicitly men-
tioned in the Fees Act. Id.
31. Id. at 694. The Court stated: "The Act itself could not be broader. It applies to 'any'
action brought to enforce certain civil rights laws. It contains no hint of an exception for States
defending injunction actions. ... Id.
32. 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
33. 448 F. Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1978).
34. A state jury acquitted the policy officer on charges of manslaughter, Id. at 1165.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
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brought suit against the Justice Department under the Civil Rights Act,36
challenging the adequacy of the federal investigation and the decision not to
prosecute.
While this suit was pending, Griffin Bell, then attorney general, issued a
memorandum directing the Justice Department to fully investigate all al-
leged violations of civil rights laws. Because the memorandum accomplished
the purpose of their suit, the Russ family's claim against the Justice Depart-
ment became moot and the district court dismissed the case. The plaintiffs,
as prevailing parties, sought and were awarded attorney's fees under the
Fees Act. 37
In the second case, Andrulis v. United States,38 the plaintiff alleged race
and sex discrimination in employment practices. 39  Dr. Marilyn W. An-
drulis, on behalf of Andrulis Research Corporation (ARC), applied and was
granted admission to a program under the Small Business Act (SBA).40  A
purpose of the SBA is to provide persons who had been denied employment
opportunity due to social or economic disadvantage access to contract
employment with federal agencies. 41  Shortly after Andrulis' admission to
the SBA program, the Small Business Administration, claiming that because
she, and therefore ARC, were not "minorities" for the purposes of the SBA
program, terminated ARC's participation. 42
After termination from the SBA program, Andrulis and ARC instituted a
suit against the United States alleging that the termination constituted unfair
race and sex discrimination. The parties to the suit entered into a consent
agreement that resulted in the reinstatement of ARC to the SBA program.
Pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiffs applied for and were granted at-
torney's fees by the district court. 43 In both Andrulis and Bell, the United
States Government appealed the award of attorney's fees to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
36. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which provides for equal rights
under the law for all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1976), which provides a right of action against conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. 448 F.
Supp. at 1166. Both of these statutes are included under the provisions of the Fees Act. For a
general discussion of these sections of the code, see Chaloupka, A Prohibition Against Private
Discrimination: Section 1981, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 677 (1978), and Comment, Civil Rights-
Private Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for Conspiracies to Impede the Due Course of Justice,
27 KAN. L. REV. 621 (1979).
37. 609 F.2d at 516.
38. No. 77-1936 (D.D.C. June 13, 1978).
39. 609 F.2d at 515. The plaintiff alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and
2000(d) (1976). For a description of sections 1981 and 1985, see note 36 supra. See also Note,
Section 1985(3): A Viable Alternative to Title VII for Sex-Based Employment Discrimination,
1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 367 (1978). Section 2000(d) generally prohibits discriminatory exclusion
from the benefits of federally assisted programs on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1976). Andrulis was granted admission to a program under section
8(a) of the Small Business Act, id. § 637(a).
41. Id. § 631(a), (c).





Faced with the issue of whether the federal government is liable for attor-
ney's fees under the Fees Act, the NAACP court found that neither the
language of the statute nor its legislative history evinced intention to abro-
gate the statutory grant of federal sovereign immunity. 44 Accordingly, the
court reversed the decisions of the district court, holding that attorney's fees
could not be awarded against the federal government. The court reasoned
that to overcome the defense of federal sovereign immunity, express statu-
tory authority 45 or authority by necessary implication 48 was required. Con-
forming to the Supreme Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 47 the court cited this statute as
the source of a federal immunity from fee awards that may be abrogated only
by other clear or express statutory authority.48  Thus, the court interpreted
section 2412 as embodying a policy against implied waiver of federal
sovereign immunity.
The court next explained what was meant by a "necessary implication" of
liability. The court cited the Clean Air Act 49 as an example. One provision
of this Act specifically permits suits against the federal government. 50
Another provision authorizes attorney's fees to "any party" mentioned in the
previous provision. 51 The court concluded that because these two provisions
must be read in pari materia, a necessary implication of United States liabil-
ity arose. 52
To determine whether the Fees Act manifested sufficient intent to waive
United States immunity from fee awards, the court focused on the portion of
44. 609 F.2d at 518. See note 8 supra.
45. 609 F.2d at 518. The court stated that in order for attorney's fees to be awarded against
the federal government, "there must be [an] 'unequivocally expressed' affirmative authorization
to overcome 28 U.S.C. § 2412." Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
554 F.2d 1188, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
46. 609 F.2d at 516-17. The court found that "statutory authorization may be inferred by
necessary implication from the statutory context in which a fee provision arises." Id.
47. 421 U.S. 240, 267-68 (1975).
48. As examples of express statutory authority, the court cited several statutes, including 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976), which provides:
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same
as the private person.
Id. (emphasis added). The court also cited the following statutes which make specific reference
to United States liability in a fee provision: 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e)
(1976); 42 U.S.C. 9 2000b-1, 2000e-5(k) (1976). 609 F.2d at 516 n.4.
49. 42 U.S.C. 99 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
50. Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act specifically permits suits against the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. § 7604(a).
51. Section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act provides: "the Court, in issuing any final order in
any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of litigation (in-
cluding reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court deter-
mines such award is appropriate." ld. § 7604(d).
52. 609 F.2d at 517.
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the Act allowing recovery of attorney's fees in "any action" to enforce civil
rights laws. 53  Noting the generality of the phrase "any action," the court
reasoned that when Congress has intended a statute to create federal liability
for attorney's fees, it has specifically so provided. 54  Therefore, the NAACP
court concluded that the "any action" language of the Fees Act was not
sufficiently specific to constitute either express statutory authorization, or
necessary implication, of United States liability for attorney's fees. 55
Finding the language of the Fees Act insufficient to create federal liability,
the court applied the rationale of Hutto v. Finney 56 to discern whether there
was express authorization or a necessary implication of federal liability under
the Fees Act. The NAACP court immediately distinguished Hutto.57 To
waive the states' defense of eleventh amendment sovereign immunity, the
Hutto court relied upon a tradition of awarding attorney's fees as part of the
costs against state governments." The NAACP court stated that federal im-
munity from attorney's fees could not be waived in the same manner for two
reasons.59  First, there existed no such analogous tradition of awarding at-
torney's fees against the federal government. Second, the court stated, with-
out elaboration, that the statutory assertion of federal sovereign immunity as
contained in section 2412 creates a more formidable barrier to a waiver of
sovereign immunity than does the eleventh amendment.60
Finally, the court examined the legislative history surrounding the Fees
Act. Because of the divergence of opinion in the congressional debates and
the silence of the House and Senate committee reports regarding federal
liability, the NAACP court found no evidence of intended federal liability
under the Fees Act. 61 The court did, however, admit that strong policy
reasons existed that would support fee awards in civil rights
cases. 62 Nevertheless, the NAACP court deferred to congressional authority
for the determination of policy regarding the Fees Act.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The NAACP court asserted that a statute creating federal liability for at-
torney's fees must contain either an express authorization or a necessary im-
53. Id. at 517-18.
54. Id. The court stated: "Unless we are to regard the prior specific references to the
United States inserted in fee provision statutes as mere surplusage, we must assume that Con-
gress considered the 'any action' language insufficient standing alone to waive federal sovereign
immunity." Id.
55. Id. at 518.
56. 437 U.S. 678 (1977). See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
57. 609 F.2d at 518.
58. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
59. 609 F.2d at 518.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 520-21.
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plication 63 of United States liability. The court's application of these two
tests, however, was not only strained, but contrary to the plain language of
the statute and its legislative history.
Initially, to determine if the Fees Act constituted sufficient statutory au-
thorization abrogating a grant of sovereign immunity, the court interpreted
the Fees Act in light of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
ety 64 mandate that a statute must expressly allow for attorney's fees in order
to overcome a defense of sovereign immunity as contained in section
2412.65 Although the NAACP court did state that an implied waiver of sec-
tion 2412 was unacceptable, it did not delineate the distinction between an
implied and an express waiver. Rather, as examples of express waiver, the
court merely listed a number of statutes that made specific reference to
United States liability in a fee provision. 66 The court emphasized that these
statutes did overcome the defense of federal immunity from fee awards. 67
By listing only statutes which specifically named the United States in a fee
provision, the NAACP court implied that only such specificity could satisfy
the Alyeska holding. The NAACP court's reasoning on this point is prob-
lematic because Alyeska did not require the United States to be specifically
mentioned by name in a statute. All that is necessary, according to Alyeska,
is an express statute that can fairly be interpreted to include the United
States within its meaning. 68 The NAACP court strained the meaning of the
Alyeska holding. 69
63. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
64. 421 U.S. 240 (1974). See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
65. 609 F.2d at 518.
66. See note 49 supra.
67. 609 F.2d at 516.
68. Because the Alyeska Court held that § 2412 could be restricted in application by a
statute which expressly provided for attorney's fees, the problems of statutory interpretation
necessarily arose. Because, once Congress enacted such a statute (e.g., the Fees Act), it became
the duty of the courts to determine its scope. Clearly, the courts needed standards for statutory
interpretation in respect to waiver of federal immunity from attorney's fees. In a 1976 Supreme
Court decision, the Court set forth a test by which to judge the degree of specificity necessary
to waive the defense of federal sovereign immunity: "(A] grant of a right of action must be made
with specificity.... [Tihe asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any
federal statute 'can be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government
for the damage sustained.' " United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (quoting Eastport
S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Thus, neither the Testan test
nor the Alyeska holding requires specific mention of the United States in a statute in order to
waive the defense of federal sovereign immunity. All that is needed is a statute with a fee
provision that could be fairly interpreted under the Testan rule to include the United States
within its ambit.
For other cases which hold that an express statute is needed to create federal liability for
attorney's fees, but do not specify that the United States must be explicitly mentioned, see
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Fitzgerald v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
554 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 512 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
69. The Alyeska Court held that the statutory assertion of sovereign immunity contained in
§ 2412 bars awards of attorney's fees against the federal government "which if allowable at all,
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Nevertheless, the NAACP court believed that only a statute specifically
mentioning the United States in a fee provision could be fairly interpreted to
include the United States within its scope. Because the court was so restric-
tive in allowing negation of section 2412, a clear explanation of the criteria
used to differentiate adequate from inadequate nullification was essential to
prevent the court's decision from appearing arbitrary. The NAACP court,
however, did not clearly articulate how it arrived at its conclusion. 70
Moreover, the court's decision did not establish any standards for statutory
interpretation. Thus, the NAACP court's failure to illuminate its method of
statutory interpretation rendered the opinion ineffective as a tool for future
courts to use when interpreting statutory language.
Because the NAACP court construed the plain language of the Fees Act as
insufficient express authorization of federal liability for attorney's fees, the
court next attempted to discern the congressional intent behind the Fees Act
in order to discover whether a necessary implication of federal liability arose.
The court stated that because Congress specifically mentioned the United
States by name in other fees provisions, it likely would have used language
at least as unequivocal in the Fees Act if it meant to abrogate section
2412.71 This reasoning led the court to conclude mistakenly that Congress
did not intend the "any action" language of the Fees Act to create United
States liability for attorney's fees. 72
The court's logic is faulty. Simply because Congress wrote fee provisions
one way in the past does not mean that it will always draft such provisions
identically. Furthermore, the court ignored the fact that Congress has
enacted broadly worded statutes that allow the courts discretion in interpre-
tation. 73  The Fees Act is exactly such a statute. Although the Act does not
specifically mention federal liability, it need not because the generality of
must be expressly provided for by statute." 421 U.S. at 267-68. This holding of the Alyeska
Court merely prohibits attorney's fees awards absent statutory authbrization. The Court did not
state that specific mention of the United States in a statute is necessary to overcome § 2412.
70. The court stated, without elaboration, that clear statutory authority for attorney's fees
"may be found in language referring specifically to the liability of the United States." Although
the court did not state that only such specificity constituted adequate waiver, it failed to cite
any other examples of adequate waiver of federal sovereign immunity. 609 F.2d at 516.
71. Id. at 518.
72. Id.
73. The propriety of using broad or liberal statutory interpretation to accomplish policy ob-
jectives has been advocated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
[Olur duty is to favor [a statutory] interpretation which would render the statu-
tory design effective in terms of the policies behind its enactment and to avoid an
interpretation which would make such policies more difficult of fulfillment, particu-
larly where, as here, that interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the
statute.
United States v. Chrysler Corp., 591 F.2d 948, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
In addition, the Supreme Court has liberally construed vague civil rights statutes in order to
carry out perceived congressional intent. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-97
(1971) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to include private conspiracies even though not specifi-
cally mentioned in the statute; citing the general language of the statute and its legislative
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the "any action" language may be interpreted as manifesting congressional
intent to include the United States within its meaning.74
Because it is so broad, the phrase "any action" can properly allow for a
wide range of interpretative readings. 75 It is common for the courts to take
advantage of broadly worded civil rights statutes in order to effectuate policy
considerations. 76  One policy consideration that engendered the Fees Act
was the encouragement of civil rights litigation. 77  Accordingly, a broad
reading of the Fees Act, which would include the United States within its
meaning, is consistent with relevant congressional intent and traditional jud-
icial practice. 78
In addition to its language, the legislative history of the Act compels a
necessary implication of federal liability. 79 Both the Senate8 0 and House"'
history as evidencing its broad scope); Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) (interpret-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as prohibiting all discrimination, including purely private discrimination,
even though the language of the statute does not specifically mention private action; citing
congressional intent as the source of such a broad reading).
74. In his dissent in NAACP, Judge Wright stated:
The majority says that this [finding the Fees Act to include federal liability] may
be done in one of two ways: (1) statutory language that specifically refers to the
liability of the United States; and (2) necessary implication from the statutory con-
text in which the fee pjovisions arises .... In my view, Section 1988 satisfies the
latter test.
609 F.2d at 521-22 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright considered the broad language of the
Fees Act and its legislative history as adequate evidence of congressional intent to include the
United States within its provisions. Id. at 522-30.
75. "Any" is a word capable of denoting generality in certain contexts where it can be
considered synonymous with the phrase "any and all." This usage of the word "any" has been
described by linguists as the "stress any" because of its emphatic and inclusive connotations. See
generally Lawler, Any Questions? 3 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS 62 (1971).
76. See note 73 supra.
77. Emphasizing the importance of attorney's fee awards in civil rights litigation, Senator
Kennedy stated:
It is of little moment for the Congress to enact laws expanding the protections
afforded citizens in securing jobs, housing, credit or education without insuring that
the beneficiaries of our laws have the means of enforcing compliance with them.
Legal battles to vindicate basic human rights-congressionally secured rights-can
be as costly as any other form of litigation, and the costs frequently outrun the
economic benefits ultimately obtained by successful litigants. Inevitably this leads to
the inability of the victims of discrimination to obtain legal redress because they
cannot shoulder the full costs of vindicating their rights.
122 CONG. REc. S31,472 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976). See note 2 supra.
78. The courts have awarded attorney's fees in civil rights actions "not simply to penalize
litigants, but to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief."
Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683, 685 (D. Minn. 1971). The purpose of fee provisions has also
been stressed in the Senate: "Where Congress decides to emphasize certain policies, and cor-
respondingly to secure private rights or encourage more vigorous enforcement of federal laws,
Congress frequently includes fee-recovery provisions in its enactments." 122 CONG. REC.
S31,472 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
79. See Brief for Appellee at 26-37, Andrulis v. United States, 609 F.2d 514 (1979). See also
609 F.2d at 523-29 (Wright, J., dissenting).




Reports, and the congressional debates 8 2 concerning the Fees Act, make it
clear that the purpose of the Act was to prevent financial limitations from
stifling adjudication of claims under any and all civil rights laws. Although
the NAACP court acknowledged the importance of the policy behind the
Act, it deferred to congressional authority for a resolution of the issue. 83
The Act itself, however, invites courts to make policy determinations by
authorizing awards to be made in the discretion of the court.8 4 Therefore,
to be consistent with the purpose and the language of the Act, the court
should have exercised its discretion and held the federal government liable
under its provisions.8 5 Nevertheless, the NAACP court shunned this oppor-
tunity by refusing to consider the social ramifications of federal liability for
attorney's fees.
The NAACP court's recalcitrance to construe the Fees Act liberally was,
however, also based upon policy considerations. Clearly, the court followed
a policy of judicial restraint regarding abrogation of federal sovereign immun-
ity for attorney's fees.8 6 Although the position of the court is clear, the
reasons why the court regarded the statutory grant of sovereign immunity as
such a formidable barrier to federal liability remains unclear. The court's
failure to explain its recalcitrance leads only to the conclusion that its narrow
reading of the Fees Act was arbitrary.
The court did assert, however, that section 2412 presents a stronger im-
munity defense to federal liability for attorney's fees than does the eleventh
amendment in regard to the states.8 7  The basis of the court's distinction
was that section 2412 explicitly requires a statute to override its provisions
whereas the eleventh amendment does not. It is this distinction that allowed
the NAACP court to reject the Hutto v. Finney 88 Court's reading of the
Fees Act to include states as irrelevant in respect to federal liability under
the Act.8 9 Although this distinction is valid, it appears rather doctrinaire
because it fails to explain adequately why courts more liberally allow waiver
of an eleventh amendment grant of sovereign immunity than a statutory
grant.
It is important to note that the Hutto decision is one of a trend of cases
limiting the restrictive power of the eleventh amendment.90 No such simi-
82. See notes 25 & 26 supra and note 92 infra.
83. 609 F.2d at 521.
84. The relevant clause in the Act reads: "[Tihe court in its discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party ...a reasonable attorney's fee .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added).
85. 609 F.2d at 531 (Wright, J., dissenting).
86. The kind of legal reasoning used by the court resembles what Karl Llewllyn has termed
the "Formal Style." Under this style a court will not inquire into policy, nor will it broadly or
liberally construe a statute. Rather, a court will strictly adhere to precedent in its resolution of
an issue. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALISTIC MOVEMENT 211 (1973).
87. 609 F.2d at 519.
88. 437 U.S. 678 (1977). See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
89. 609 F.2d at 518-19.
90. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907), the Supreme Court held that a federal court
could enjoin a state official. The Young doctrine, therefore, allowed federal courts to monitor
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lar progression of cases exists regarding judicial limitations upon the federal
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Rather, the judiciary has traditionally
strictly construed any waiver of immunity by the United States. 9' The
NAACP decision is part of this tradition of judicial restraint with respect to
waivers of federal sovereign immunity. Therefore, the NAACP court's defer-
ence to the statutory grant of sovereign immunity merely reflects the judicial
conservatism of the court. That the court's approach was conservative is not
disquieting. That the court did not explain the policy behind its conser-
vatism, however, is disappointing.
IMPACT OF THE NAACP DECISION
The NAACP decision impairs, rather than furthers, the intended purpose
of the Fees Act. A recurring theme during congressional consideration of the
Act was the effect which the high cost of litigation has upon enforcement of
an individual's federally mandated rights. 92 The proponents of the bill were
acutely aware that the typical plaintiff in a civil rights suit is often not in a
position to afford the ever increasing costs of litigation. 93 In contrast, the
typical defendant, often a private corporation or government agency, is cap-
able of bearing such costs. 94 Unless a plaintiff is given financial help in
securing his or her civil rights, those rights exist only in theory. 95 The
aftermath of the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
ety 96 evidences the deterrent effect that denial of attorney's fees has in civil
rights cases. After Alyeska the number of private suits brought to enforce
federal laws declined due to the judicial restriction upon the permissibility of
fee awards. 97 The NAACP decision will result in a similar pattern of decline
state conduct by allowing injunctions against state officials. The doctrine was refined in Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which established standards to determine the limits of the
eleventh amendment. Edelman held that the states were liable for prospective damage awards;
however, retroactive relief was held barred by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 668-72. Edelman
was extended in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which held that states were liable
for retroactive relief because the eleventh amendment was limited by the enforcement provi-
sions of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 456.
91. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22, at 82 (3d ed. 1976).
92. See note 2 supra and note 97 infra.
93. Id.
94. For a detailed discussion of the necessity of fee awards to mitigate the discrepancy
between the financial resources of the typical plaintiff and defendant in civil rights litigation, see
Falcon, supra note 1, and Cedar, Defrosting the Alyeska Chill: The Future of Attorney Fee
Awards in Environmental Litigation, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 297-99 (1976). Although Cedar concen-
trates on environmental litigation, he notes that the typical situation in public interest and civil
rights litigation often involves defendants with far greater financial resources than individual
plaintiffs.
95. See Falcon, supra note 1, at 389.
96. 421 U.S. 240 (1974). See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
97. The decline of private party suits in civil rights litigation is evidenced by the remarks of
Senator Scott after Alyeska:
Given the often staggering costs of litigation, this decision [Alyeska] has predictably
slowed the number of private suits brought to enforce federally mandated rights,
1190 [Vol. 29:1177
NAACP V. CIVILETTI
in the number of private suits brought against the federal government under
the Fees Act.98
Because the NAACP holding discourages lawsuits against the federal gov-
ernment by individual plaintiffs, many federal agencies will be immunized
from strict accountability to the public.9 9 The impact of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's decision is amplified due to the significant number of federal
agencies located within that jurisdiction. In the final analysis, it is ironic that
although the federal government authored the Fees Act in the best interests
of the public, it is held least responsible under the Act's provisions.
CONCLUSION
The rising costs of litigation compels judicial activism regarding attorney's
fee awards. The need for judicial activism is particularly important in civil
rights cases because basic human rights associated with the dignity and
equality of individuals are at stake. Many federal agencies are responsible for
programs that inherently involve civil rights concerns, such as housing,
employment, and credit. To ensure that these federal entities are responsi-
ble to the public, judicial discipline of such agencies should not be inhibited
by a plaintiff's lack of funds. By enacting the Fees Act, Congress granted the
judiciary broad discretionary power to authorize fee awards. Because the
congressional purpose is so clear, it should be a paramount concern of the
courts to include the federal government within the scope of the Act.
Clearly, the NAACP court, by denying an award of attorney's fees against
the federal government, has restricted implementation of this congressional
policy and has threatened the private enforcement of fundamental human
rights.
Marie Adornetto
including cases premised upon our civil rights laws .... Unless Congress enacts [the
Fees Act], one of the groups of potential litigants most severely affected by
Alyeska-those persons seeking to assert their rights under Federal civil rights
statutes-will frequently be denied access to Federal courts.
122 CONG. REC. S31,471 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
98. See notes 2 & 94 supra and note 99 infra.
99. The Senate Report stressed that the full enforcement of federal statutes depends on the
availability of fee awards which "are ancillary and incident to securing compliance with these
laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such com-
pliance." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
1980] 1191

